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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
WHITNEY D. HAMMOND, Administrator of the Estate of Jim Eskridge,
Deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.

vs.

8827

ZELPH S. CALDER,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties herein will sometimes be designated in this
brief as follows: Plaintiff and respondent, Whitney D.
Hammond, Administrator of the Estate of Jim Eskridge,
deceased, as the "respondent," original plaintiff Jim Eskridge as "plaintiff," and Zelph S. Calder, defendant and
appellant, as "appellant." Emphasis has been supplied.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
We deem it essential to a proper disposition of this cas
that all of the facts be fully presented. Because we believ
that the brief of the appellant does not do so we will under
take to set forth concisely the essential facts. Reference
to the record will be designated as "R," and references t~
the transcript of proceedings as "T.P."
Appellant owns property located on Diamond Moun
tain in Uintah County approximately thirty-five miles north
east of Vernal, Utah. On September 26, 1950, appellan
entered into a written lease with plaintiff, a resident of th
State of Colorado, under the terms of which plaintiff ob
tained the right to farm part of appellant's land and agreec
to pay appellant one-fourth of the crops produced thereon
The lease had a primary term of eight years beginnin~
November 1, 1950 (R. 2). At the time the lease was exe
cuted none of the leased land had been cleared and it wa:
necessary for plaintiff to clear the land before crops coul<
be planted. Plaintiff subsequently cleared approximate!~
658 acres (T.P. 19).
The lease provided that appellant was to have grazin~
rights on the lands, but that plaintiff was to have the ex·
elusive right to say when appellant could graze his livestocl
on the growing grain. Appellant was to maintain fence:
around the premises in a condition that would prevent range
stock from damaging the crops (R. 2). On numerous occa
sions appellant permitted his livestock to go upon the Ian<
farmed by plaintiff without permission, causing consider
able damage to the crops growing thereon. On October 13
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1955, plaintiff filed a complaint against appellant in the
Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Utah in and
for Uintah County, praying for a temporary restraining
order restraining appellant from further trespassing, grazing or damaging the crops and for damages in the amount
of Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00) (R.
1).

On October 18, 1955, appellant served a notice demanding that plaintiff file a nonresident cost bond (R. 7). Plaintiff was killed in an airplane accident on October 29, 1955
(R. 84). A motion for an extension of time for filing the
cost bond in order that an administrator of plaintiff's
estate could be appointed was filed and granted on November 15, 1955 (R. 9 and 10). Appellant filed a motion to
dismiss with prejudice for failure to file a nonresident cost
bond on December 17, 1955 (R. 11).
On January 9, 1956, plaintiff's widow who had been
appointed administratrix of his estate in the State of Colorado filed a motion asking the court to deny appellant's
motion to dismiss on the ground that she had filed a petition asking for the appointment of Whitney D. Hammond,
a Utah resident, as Administrator of the Estate of Jim
Eskridge in the State of Utah, and a motion praying for his
substitution as party plaintiff in place of her deceased husband in the proceedings against appellant. She further
alleged that an ancillary administrator of the estate of a
nonresident deceased plaintiff who has been substituted as
a party plaintiff should not be required to file a nonresident cost bond (R. 12). Appellant's motion to dismiss was
denied on January 12, 1956 (R. 13). Letters of Adminis-
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tration were issued to Whitney D. Hammond on Februar;
7, 1956, (R. 86) and an order substituting Whitney D
Hammond, administrator, as party plaintiff was enterec
the same day (R. 16). Appellant filed an answer and coun
terclaim February 29, 1956 (R. 19). Plaintiff's reply wa:
filed April 3, 1956. The case was set for trial June 25
1956. On the date set for trial appellant and responden
through their respective counsel entered into a stipulatim
of settlement in the presence of the trial Judge, Honorable
Maurice Harding (R. 35).
The stipulation provided in part that the responden1
would be permitted to harvest the grain growing on thE
south and middle units of the Calder property and sell thE
estate's share of the wheat under appellant's wheat allot.
ment and appellant would be given immediate possessior
of the north unit (R. 35). Subsequently, a dispute arose a~
to whether the respondent had the right to sell the estate'~
share of the wheat under appellant's wheat allotment freE
from the penalty incurred when appellant harvested thE
volunteer wheat on the north unit, thereby causing the total
acreage harvested on the Calder property to exceed the
acreage allotment set by the Uintah County Stabilizatio11
Committee and subjecting all of the wheat to a penalty.
Judge Harding ruled that under the terms of the stipulation,
the respondent had the right to sell the estate's share o1
the wheat free from penalty and so ordered (R. 12).
The stipulation also provided that appellant would pa~
respondent two-sevenths of the cost of clearing the land.
The cost of clearing was to be determined by two people~
one selected by the appellant and one by the respondent.
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The persons so selected found that the cost of clearing was
Twelve Dollars ($12.00) per acre (R. 36). This figure
included the cost of the first plowing by which plaintiff
broke the ground for the first time and cut or broke the
brush loose so it could be raked into piles for burning ( T .P.
10 and 11). Appellant refused to accept this figure claiming that the cost of the first plowing should not have been
included as a part of the cost of clearing the land. After
hearing evidence, the trial court ruled that the parties intended that the cost of the first plowing should be included
in the cost of clearing at the time they entered into the
stipulation and that the cost of clearing the land was
Twelve Dollars ($12.00) per acre (T.P. 37 and 38) and
ordered appellant to pay two-sevenths of the cost of clearing plus costs (R. 71).
Appellant filed a pleading designated "Defendant's
Request for Claim against Plaintiff" on January 21, 1958,
praying for judgment against the respondent in the amount
of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) for
damages arising from the removal of a steel granary which
plaintiff had placed on the Calder premises to be used in
storing grain thereon (R. 77). Appellant presented no evidence regarding this claim and the court below denied appellant's "Request" (R. 78).
Appellant now appeals from the following:
1. Court's order denying appellant's motion to dismiss
with prejudice for failure of ancillary administrator to file
nonresident cost bond.
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2. Court's order requiring appellant to permit respon
dent to sell estate's share of wheat under appellant's whea
allotment without penalty in accordance with the terms o:
the Stipulation of Settlement.
3. Court's finding that the cost of clearing was Twelv4
Dollars ($12.00) per acre.
4.

Court's award of costs to respondent.

5. Court's denial of appellant's "Request for Clain
Against Plaintiff."

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPE~
LANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO FILE NONRESIDENT
COST BOND.
POINT II.
COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE
TERMS OF STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT.

POINT III.
COURT PROPERLY ENTERED ORDER PERMITTING RESPONDENT TO SELL WHEAT
WITHOUT PENALTY.
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POINT IV.
COURT'S FINDING AS TO COST OF CLEARING LAND WAS PROPER.

POINT V.
COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S
CLAIM AGAINST RESPONDENT FOR REMOVAL OF GRANARY.

POINT VI.
COURT PROPERLY AWARDED COSTS TO
RESPONDENT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPE~
LANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO FILE NONRESIDENT
COST BOND.

Appellant contends that the court erred in denying
his motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure to file a
nonresident cost bond. In this regard it should be noted
that plaintiff filed the complaint in the instant case on
October 13, 1955. Plaintiff died on October 29, 1955.
Whitney D. Hammond, a Utah resident, was subsequently
appointed ancillary administrator of plaintiff's estate in
Utah and substituted as party plaintiff.
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Rule 12 (j), Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code All
notated, 1953, provides that plaintiffs who reside outsid
the state or are foreign corporations must file cost bond
upon demand. Rule 12 (j) provides that a nonresiden
plaintiff shall have thirty days after service of notice re
questing security for costs to file a cost bond. This perioc
had not elapsed at the time of plaintiff's death. Therefore
at that time the court below had no power to dismiss fo:
failure to file the cost bond.
If the original plaintiff was not obligated to file a cos

bond prior to his death, the only question which remain:
is whether a Utah resident who is subsequently appointe<
and qualified as ancillary administrator of plaintiff's es
tate in the State of Utah and substituted as party plaintif:
should be required to file a cost bond. There are no Utal
statutes that so provide.
The courts have long held that the right to requirt
security for costs is a creature of statute, and unless thE
obligation of furnishing security has been imposed by legis·
lative enactment, a party may not be required to file a cosi
bond or guarantee the payment of costs. Honduras v. Soto
172 N.Y. 310, 19 N. E. 845; Ann: 24 Eng. Rul. Cas. 31
As indicated in Outlaw v. Pearce, 11 S. E. 2d 600, 603, 17(
Va. 458, the purpose of such statutes is to insure to tht
defendant and to the officials of the court the payment o:
costs which may be awarded against a nonresident plaintif:
against whom the court has no means of enforcing a collec
tion, and to insure that the court will have some financiall~
responsible person within reach of process. State ex rel
Tangon v. District Court, 111 Mont. 178, 107 P. 2d 880, 881
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It would, therefore, appear clear that there is no need
for an ancillary administrator who is an officer of the
court to post a cost bond to insure payment of costs. This
is especially true in the instant case where the administrator has filed a corporate surety bond in the amount of
Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) (R. 851/2) and there
are considerable assets in the Utah estate (R. 87).

The Utah Supreme Court has on several occasions held
that the provisions requiring cost bonds should be construed
so as to permit litigants to have every reasonable opportunity to be heard on the merits of the case. In discussing
this problem the court in Bunting Tractor Co. v. Emmett D.
Ford Contractm·s, 2 Utah 2d 275, 272 P. 2d 191, said that:
"The objection raised by defendant that security for costs was not filed within one month after
notice is at best but a technical one. The only legitimate advantage defendant was entitled to was protection from loss of costs. * * *"
and that

"* * * The general philosophy of the new
Rules of Civil Procedure is that liberality should be
indulged 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.' In construing and
applying these rules it should be the purpose of the
courts to afford litigants every reasonable opportunity to be heard on the merits of their cases. This
policy is not an innovation to our law. It has long
been embodied both in the statutes and decisions
that deviation from form and procedure shall not
work a forfeiture of substantive rights in the absence of prejudice to the opposing party."
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There would appear to be absolutely no basis upot
which the Utah statute could be construed so as to requir4
an ancillary administrator to file a cost bond. Therefore
the court below had no alternative but to deny appellant'~
motion to dismiss.
POINT II.
COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE
TERMS OF STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT.
On the date set for trial, appellant and responden1
through their respective counsel after considerable discussion of all aspects of the case entered into a stipulation o1
settlement in the presence of the court. Appellant thereafter failed to perform in accordance with the terms o1
the stipulation and under Point II of his brief questiom
the authority of the court below to enforce the terms of
the stipulation.
In view of the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court,
there can be no question as to the law regarding this question in Utah. The court was confronted with almost exactly the same question in Johnson v. Peoples Finance and
Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246, 272 P. 2d 171, where the cour1
stated that:

"* * * However, when the parties failed tc
perform in accordance with their stipulations, thE
court was not powerless to require them to abide b'
their agreement. It would indeed be a serious reflection upon our system of jurisprudence if partie~
could stipulate an agreement of settlement but refuse with impunity from performing. Courts are no1
impotent when one or more parties to a stipulatior
becomes recalcitrant. * * *"
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This is in accord with the rule generally accepted elsewhere.
It is, therefore, clear that the court below had authority

to enforce the terms of the stipulation of settlement.

POINT III.
COURT PROPERLY ENTERED ORDER PERMITTING RESPONDENT TO SELL WHEAT
WITHOUT PENALTY.
Appellant contends that the court erred in permitting
the respondent to sell the estate's share of the wheat harvested on the Calder property in the fall of 1956 under
appellant's wheat allotment without penalty. In this regard it should be noted that in order to participate in the
U. S. Department of Agriculture Commodity Stabilization
Program the plaintiff could harvest grain from only part
of land which he was farming. Therefore, during the fall
of 1955 plaintiff planted grain in only the south and middle
units of the Calder property but planted nothing in the
north unit. Some volunteer grain was growing on the north
unit at the time appellant and respondent entered into the
stipulation of settlement. The stipulation provided in part
that the respondent would harvest the grain then growing
on the south and middle units and give appellant one-fourth
of grain harvested (R. 35). The respondent knew that if
the volunteer grain growing on the north unit was harvested the acreage allotment established by the County
Stabilization Committee could not be complied with, and
the grain harvested on the south and middle units could
not be sold under appellant's wheat allotment without a
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penalty. Prior to entering into the stipulation this problem was discussed at great length in the presence of the
court with appellant and his counsel. The respondent did
not care what happened to the volunteer wheat on the north
:unit so long as it was not used in a manner that would
prevent respondent from selling the estate's share of the
wheat under appellant's wheat allotment. It was under
these circumstances that the respondent agreed to give
appellant immediate possession of the north unit and the
appellant agreed that "the plaintiff (respondent) shall
have the right to sell his share of the wheat under appellant's wheat allotment" (R. 35) . In spite of that understanding, appellant proceeded to harvest the volunteer wheat
growing on the north unit. As a result, the Agricultural
Stabilization Committee for Uintah County ruled that none
of the wheat harvested on the Calder property could be
sold under defendant's wheat allotment without penalty.
Appellant refused to permit the respondent to sell the estate's share of the wheat without penalty. On October 23,
1956, Judge Harding ruled that under the terms of the
stipulation the respondent was entitled to sell his share of
the wheat under appellant's wheat allotment without penalty and ordered the appellant to refrain from taking any
action which would prevent the respondent from obtaining
the necessary authority to do so.
Appellant now contends that the trial judge was in
error in so ruling. Judge Harding was present throughout
the discussion which led up to the stipulation of settlement
and was present at the time it was entered into. It is fundamental that stipulations must be construed in light of
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the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time they
entered into the stipulation and in view of the result which
they were attempting to accomplish. People v. Nolan, 33
Cal. App. 493, 496, 165 P. 2d 715, 716; Hengel v. Hengel,
329 Mo. 571, 46 S. W. 2d 157. Judge Harding who was fully
apprised of the circumstances surrounding the making of
the stipulation ruled that the parties intended that the respondent would be able to sell the estate's share of the
wheat under appellant's wheat allotment free of penalty
and ordered appellant to take whatever action necessary
to obtain that result. To adopt appellant's contention would
render the last phrase of the stipulation meaningless.
As indicated in the discussion under Point II above, it
was within the power of the trial court to construe the
provisions of the stipulation and enforce the terms thereof.

POINT IV.
COURT'S FINDING AS TO COST OF CLEARING LAND WAS PROPER.
Appellant in Point III of his brief contends that the
court's finding as to the cost of clearing the land was not
substantiated by the evidence. In this regard it should be
noted that the primary term of the Eskridge lease was
eight years beginning November 1, 1950 (R. 2). At the
time the lease was executed, none of the property had been
cleared. Plaintiff subsequently cleared 658 acres of the
Calder property. When the parties entered into the stipulation of agreement, appellant agreed to pay the respondent two-sevenths of the cost of clearing the premises and
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respondent agreed that the lease would be terminated after
the grain had been harvested in the fall of 1956 (R. 35).
In clearing the land plaintiff had experimented with
several methods of clearing. The one he found most satisfactory and which he used to clear the most of the land
consisted of first plowing the land with a specially designed
machine to cut the brush and break the soil, then either
raking or harrowing to gather the brush into piles for
burning and finally burning the brush. After the brush
had been burned, it was necessary to plow the land again
and in some cases go over it with a leveler in order to prepare the seed bed (T.P. 10 and 11).
Appellant and respondent agreed that two persons
would be selected to determine the cost of clearing the land.
Appellant selected Wayne Goodrich and the respondent
selected Raymond Searle (R. 35). Searle and Goodrich
agreed that the cost of clearing the land was Twelve Dollars ($12.00) per acre and filed a report to that effect (R.
36) . This figure included the cost of the plaintiff's initial
plowing which he used to cut the brush and loosen the soil.
Appellant refused to accept this figure claiming that the
term "clearing" as used in the stipulation was not intended
to include the cost of the first plowing.
On November 26, 1957, the trial judge heard evidence
pertaining to the cost of clearing. At the hearing Raymond
Searle testified that he had cleared land in the vicinity of
the Calder property for eighteen or twenty years (T.P. 4).
That in his opinion such land could not be cleared properly
without first plowing it because otherwise you could not
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obtain a good kill on the brush (R. 10). That the first
plowing was much more difficult and expensive than subsequent plowings because the soil in the area of the Calder
property is very hard and it is necessary to cut or break
the brush loose, so that it can be raked and burned (R. 12).
He further explained that after the brush is broken or cut
loose it is necessary to rake or harrow it into piles for
burning and then the brush must be burned (T.P. 10 and
11). After the burning, the land must be plowed again and
in many cases leveled before seeds can be planted (T.P. 11).
He testified that he was familiar with the Calder land and
plaintiff's methods of clearing it and that in his opinion
it cost plaintiff a minimum of Twelve Dollars ( $12.00) per
acre to clear the land and that it probably cost him substantially more (T.P. 7 and 15). This figure included only
the costs of the first plowing, raking and burning operations and did not include the cost of subsequent operations
necessary to prepare the soil for planting.
Mr. Wayne Goodrich did not appear at this hearing
and defendant's only witnesses were himself and his brother,
Leo Calder.
The court after hearing the evidence ruled that
"* * * the clearing included the plowing, that that was
included within the contemplation of the parties at the
time the stipulation was made * * *" (T.P. 37), and
that the cost of clearing the ground was Twelve Dollars
($12.00) per acre (T.P. 38).
It is submitted that in addition to the evidence outlined
herein the transcript of proceedings of the hearing held
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for the purpose of determining the cost of clearing discloses
substantial evidence in support of Judge Harding's finding
as to the cost of clearing. The arguments with reference
to the trial court's authority to construe the stipulation
and enforce the terms thereof presented under Points II
and III above are also applicable here.

POINT V.
COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S
CLAIM AGAINST RESPONDENT FOR REMOVAL OF GRANARY.
On January 21, 1958, appellant filed a pleading designated "Defendant's Request for Claim Against Plaintiff"
praying for judgment against plaintiff in the amount of
Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) plus costs
for damages arising from the removal of a granary which
plaintiff had placed on the Calder property. It is difficult
to determine just what this pleading is but it appears to
be more closely related to a counterclaim than anything
else. There are no provisions in the Utah statutes which
would permit the filing of a pleading such as this.
Appellant presented no evidence with relation to his
"Request." The minute entry dated January 21, 1958, states
that "the motion for hearing claims in this matter was
denied" (R. 78). It is not clear whether this entry refers
to appellant's "Request." If it does, there is nothing to
indicate whether the court considered the "Request" on its
merits or denied the motion upon other grounds. In view
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of the present state of the record, we submit that there
is nothing properly before the court.
In this regard it should also be noted that the burden
is upon the appellant to affirmatively show error. The
Utah Supreme Court has adopted the rule that judgments
of courts are presumed to be correct, if nothing in the record appears to the contrary. Burton v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249 P. 2d 514; Johnson v.
Peoples Finance and Thrift Co., supra.

POINT VI.
COURT PROPERLY AWARDED COSTS TO
RESPONDENT.
Rule 54 (d) (1), Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, provides that "* * * costs shall be allowed * * * to the prevailing party. * * *" In
the instant case judgment was rendered in favor of the
respondent and he was a warded costs as the prevailing
party (R. 72).
Appellant's failure to comply with the term of the
stipulation resulted in additional hearings and expenses
and finally a judgment against appellant.
Appellant now contends on page 19 of his brief that
since the court rendered a judgment against him, the equitable thing to do would be to assess costs against the respondent. We submit that such a contention has no merit
whatsoever.
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CONCLUSION
We submit that the trial court's actions with regard
to this matter were proper in all respects. The original
plaintiff was not obligated to file a cost bond prior to his
death and the ancillary administrator who was substituted
as party plaintiff is not required to file a cost bond. Therefore, the trial court had no alternative other than to deny
appellant's motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure to
file a cost bond. The trial court was familiar with the circumstances surrounding the making of the stipulation of
settlement and the results the parties intended to achieve
thereby. The construction given to the disputed provisions
in the stipulation was in accord with the language used in
the stipulation, and the court was authorized to enforce
the terms thereof. The court's finding as to the cost of
clearing is fully supported by the evidence. There is nothing properly before this court regarding appellant's claim
for damages arising from the removal of a granary. Rule
54 (d) ( 1) , Rules of Ci vii Procedure, expressly provides
that costs may be awarded to the prevailing party.
For the reasons set forth herein we respectfully submit
that the judgment and the various orders of the trial court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

COLTON & HAMMOND,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
STERLING D. COLTON,
Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Suite 300, 65 South Main Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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